No Panacea: Insider Control of Corporations and Environmental Performance

We examine firms with a dual-class share structure where insiders (officers and directors) have voting control over the firm that exceeds their ownership stake. We find that when these insiders have significantly more voting control, their firms demonstrate poorer, rather than better, environmental performance.

Regulating charities: snakes or ladders?

We examine two charities (a museum and a disability rights organization) that were in breach of  this soft regulation; however, we suggest each faced different levels of reputational risk by doing so. We argue that charities are most at risk of being perceived as acting inappropriately when they breach regulations that are aimed at financial propriety.

The Revolving Doors of Washington and the Sliding Doors of Brussels

Our paper opens up the “black box” of the government affairs practices conducted by companies in Brussels and draws a comparison between the practices there and those in Washington D.C. We find that, although companies in both sites use similar resources, the daily management practices vary a lot.

Are corporate saints more credible?

If companies make economic and social reasons for their sustainable investments known, they run the risk of their legitimacy being called into question. Our study shows that when individuals assume that a company’s sustainable investments are strategically motivated and driven by economic interests, they will assess companies’ credibility and legitimacy negatively.